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ABSTRACT
Two experiments were conducted to examine the
validity of preschoolers I beliefs about the influence of
effort and anticipated reward value on recall. In
Experiment 1 preschool~rs judged the individual and
combined effects of high versus low memory effort, and
high versus low anticipated reward value, on recall. The
results indicated that preschoolers believe that recall
increases with effort and with reward value. They also
believe that the anticipation of a high value reward will
elicit higher effort, and result in superior recall than
the anticipation of a low value reward. The validity of
these b~liefs was investigated in Experiment 2 by
examining preschoolers' actual recall performance and
strategic effort (stUdy time and study behaviour) when
promised a reward of either high or low value. Subjects
recalled significantly more toys when they anticipated
receiving a high relative to a low value reward.
However. the value of the anticipated reward had no
observable effects on stUdy effort. The results are
discussed in terms of the importance of preschoolers'
beliefs about memory effort.
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INTRODUCTION
overview
Preschoolers usually perform more poorly than older
children on llIemory tasks. One reason for preschoolers'
poorer performance is that they use fewer mnemonic
strategies than older children. Furthermore, even when
preschoolers use strategies on memory tasks, those
strategies are often ineffective. That is, they do not
lead to superior recall. Several hypotheses have been
advanced to explain preschoolers' strategic processing on
memory tasks (Baker-Ward, ornstein, , Holden, 1984:
Bisanz, Danner, & Resnick, 1979; Bjorklund, 1987; Brown,
1978; Flavell, 1971; Hagen, Jongeward, , Kail, 1975; Howe
, O'Sullivan, 1990: Kail, 1988; Kintsch, 1970; Kreutzer,
Leonard, , Plavell, 1975; Kurtz , Borkowski, 1984;
Hiller, 1990: Hoely, 1977; O'SUllivan, 1993; Shiffrin &
Dumais, 1981: Wellman, 1977, 1988). These include
hypotheses about the role of processing resources,
conceptual knowledge, and metamemory in preschoolers'
strategic processing. Most researchers have focused on
the contributions of processing re~("l"TCeS and conceptual
knowledge. Recently, however, there has been increasing
attention placed on the role of metamemory in directing
preschoolers I strategic mnemonic efforts.
Metam£lmory is knowledge and beliefs about memory,
and considerable research indicates that what children
believe about memory influences their behaviour on memory
tasks (Pressley, Borkowski, Schneider, 1987).
Relatively little is known about preschoolers 1
metarnemory, although it seems that effort plays a pivotal
role in their beliefs about memory, and that these
bel iefs about effort influence preschoolers' strategic
memory bohaviour (O'Sullivan, 1993, 1994). A major
challenge for researchers is to map out preschoolers'
beliefs about the role of effort in memory and the impact
of those beliefs on strategic memory behaviour and
performance. In this study, preschoolers' beliefs about
the influence of effort and anticipated reward value on
recall were measured and the validity of those beliefs
established.
This introduction is arranged in the following
order. First, the literature on mnemonic strategic
processing in preschoolers is reviewed. This includes an
examination of the effectiveness of preschoolers'
strategic efforts on memory tasks, as well as an
exploration of the various hypotheses concerning their
strategic effectiveness. Then, preschoolers' metamemory
about the impact of strategic effort on memory is
discussed, together with the influence of those bellefs
on memory behaviour and performance. Finally, the
present study is introduced.
strategic Behaviour Displayed By Preschoolers
Memory strategiel:: are plans of action (such as
visually examining, naming, and categorizing items) which
children generate to facilitate the storage and retrieval
of information (Howe & O'sullivan, 1990). During the
early 1970s the development of memory strategies was
considered predominantly responsible for developments in
children's memory performance (Brown, 1978; Hagen et al.,
1975; Kintsch, 1970; Kreutzer et a1., 1975; Moely, 1977).
Research conducted during that decade was concentrated on
the memory development of school-aged children. In
general, researchers concluded that strategies typically
begin to emerge during the early school years, and become
increasingly sophisticated thereafter, with corresponding
increases in memory performance.
Preschoolers were viewed for the most part as being
non-strategic, non-planful, and even deficient in terms
of their memory strategy capability (Perlmutter & Myers,
1979; Ratner, 1980). This point of view was quite
prevalent until challenged by researchers who began to
uncover strong evidence of strategic ability at the
preschool level (Baker-Ward et al., 1984; Deloache,
Cassidy, & Brown, 1985; Pressley et al., 1987; Wellman,
Ritter, & Flavell, 1975; Yussen, 1974; Yussen, Kunen, &
Buss, 1975). Ne1Iman et al. (1975), for example,
reported that 3-year-olds instructed I to remember'
exhibited certain simple memory strategies such as
touching a hiding place or marking a location with a cue,
whereas children instructed 'to wait' did not.
Furthermore, children who used these strategies recalled
more items in comparison with others instructed simply
'to wait'.
Baker-Ward et a1. (1984) also reported the use of
strategies by preschoolers. In their study 4-, 5-, and
6-year-olds were asked either to play with or to remember
a group of toys. In general, children instructed to
remember exhibited a more deliberate approach to the task
than childrel' instructed to play. That is, they named
and visually scanned the array of toys more, and played
with the toys less, than SUbjects instructed to play.
Despite these demonstrated differences in strategic
activity during the study period, recall differences
between the remember versus play condi tions were only
evident for the oldest subjects, where recall was
significantly higher in the remember condition. Baker-
Ward et al. (1984) concluded that although preschoolers
did not display adult strategies (e.g., categorization)
they were, nevertheless, strategic and used
developmentally appropriate strategies such as object
manipUlation, labelling, and visual examination.
Even toddlers as young as 18 months at age have been
observed using strategy-like activit.ies when instructed
to remember. Deloache et al. (1985) conducted a study in
which a toy was hidden (e.g., a Big Bird toy is hidden
under a chair CUshion) and, following a delay of 1-4
minutes, the child had to find the toy. These 18- to 24-
month-old children displayed rehearsal-like activities
during the delay, such as referring to the hidden toy
(e.g., "8ig Bird"), to the hiding place (e.g., "Big Bird
chair"), and to eventually revealing the toy (e.g., "find
Big Bird"). The children also made visual contact with
the toy's hiding place by looking, pointing, or peeking
at the toy. According to Deloache et a1. (1985) these
behaviours are very similar to the more complex mnemonic
strategies exhibited by older children such as rehearsal
and self-monitoring (checking). These results provide
further evidence that even very young children possess a
rUdimentary capacity for using mnemonic strategies and a
basic awareness of the need to do something special to
remember.
collectively, these and other studies of
preschoolers' strategic behaviour provided evidence that
preschoolers can engage in various strategies in order to
remember. \~hen these studies were published they
challenged the more traditional view from the 1970's that
preschoolers are non-strategic. still, preschoolers are
not consistent in their use of strategies. For example,
variations in the memory task, or in the to-be-remembered
items, are associated with variations in preschoolers'
tendency to be strategic (e.g., Isotomina, 1975; Newman,
1990; Schneider & Brun, 19871 weissberg & Paris, 1986).
~Furthermore, simply using a memory strategy does not
guarantee effective memory performance. In the next
section, the effectiveness of preschoolers' memory
strategies on recall tasks will be discussed.
ErLectiveness ot Preschoolers' Strategic He~ry
Behaviour
Given that preschoolers are strategic
tasks what impact do their strategies have
recall
recall
performance? That is, does strategy use facilitate
preschoolers I recall performance? Most researchers have
failed to find significant relationships betwe~n strategy
use and recall performance among preschoolers. Baker-
Ward et al. (1984), for example, found no correspondence
between overt strategy use and recall except among the
older 6-year-old SUbjects. Although the 3- and 4-year-
olds were strategic they did not seem to derive any
benefit from their efforts in terms of recall
performance. O'Sullivan (1993) also reported that
differences in the strategic behaviours used by
preschoolers during a free-recall task were not
associated with differences in recall. Such findings
have been further corroborated by Lange, MacKinnon, and
Nida (1989) who found no significant relationships
between ..i..ml.i.ll.id study behaviours and recall for 4-
year-olds. However, Lange et a1. (1989) derived a
weighted strategy summary score tor each sUbject,
calculated to give most weight to the use of "mature"
strategies such as naming and grouping. Lange et a1.
(1989) found a significant positive relationship between
this weighted strategy summary score and recall.
Overall, although there is little doubt that preschoolers
can be strategic, the weight of the evidence at the
present time suggests that their strategic behaviour is
not associated, in any straightforward way, with their
recall performance (Baker-Ward et al., 1984; Miller,
1990; Wellman, 1988).
When preschoolers use memory strategies that fail
to influence recall performance, those strZl.tegies are
referred to as fllulty or ineffective strategies. Wellman
(1988) argued that ....hile on the rOlld to strategic
expertise, preschoolers execute many unsuccessful or
faulty strategies. Faulty strategies are also used by
older children, however, preschoolers are apparently such
amateurs to memory tasks that the strategies they display
tend to be more faUlty than effective, overall (Wellman,
1988). Similarly, Miller (1990) recently introduced the
concept of utilization deficiency to explain the lag
between using a strategy and benefitting from it.
According to Miller (1990) when children first use a
strategy deliberately, recall does not improve
immediately. But, following persistent strategy use, it
improves eventually. A.lthough, utilization deficiencies
are demonstrated by older children, for specific
strategies it seems that preschoolers have widespread
utilization deficiencies in their strategy use.
Why do preschoolers frequently produce faulty or
utilization deficient strategies, and how do presch(lolers
develop into effective strategy l,;sers? A number of
hypotheses have been advanced. These include hypotheses
concerni.ng the role of processing resources, conceptual
knowledge, and metamemory. According to the resources
argument, preschoolers exert a greater amount of mental
effort when producing a strategy than school-aged
children (Bisanz et al., 1979; Bjorklund, 1987).
Furthermore, producir'J a strategy is often so effortful
for preschoolers that few resources are left for
utilization (Miller, 1990). As children develop,
execution of strategies becomes increasingly automatized
and less effort is required for strategy execution. A.s
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a result, more resources are made available for
utilization (Howe" O'sullivan, 1990).
Conceptual knowledge also plays a significant role
in children's strategy use and recall performance.
Preschoolers are more likely to use strategies
effectively when they possess considerable knowledge and
experience with the memory task and the to-he-remembered
material (Howe & O'Sullivan, 1990). Conceptual }<nowledge
appears to enable or ease strategy use, in that, when ta-
be-remembered items are activated with ease, resources
are freed for strategy production and utilization
(Pressley et al., 1987). Conceptual knowledge develops
with age, influencing how easily information can be
accessed, which in turn influences the amount of
information processing capacity that is available for
various other cognitive operations such as employing
memory strategies (Bjorklund, 1987).
The third factor that is related to preschoolers I
strategic effectiveness is metamemory - or knowledge and
beliefs about memory. It is argued that preschoolers'
beliefs about memory are related to their use of
strategies on memory tasks (Miller, 1990; O'SUllivan,
1993). In particular, preschoolers may have naive
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beliefs about memory that are associated with their use
of t:aul ty strategies. Less is known about the role of
metamemory in preschoolers' strategic procetlsing than
about resources or conceptual knowledge. Recently,
however, the impact af mctamemory on preschoolers I
effective and ineffective strategic processing has
received increasing attention. Hetamemory will be
discussed in detail in the next section.
In summary, the body of research on strategic
mnemonic processing among preschoolers portrays a
transitional period that involves the gradual development
of an appropriate strategy, followed by gradual
improvement in recall performance (Demaria-Oreblow &
Miller, 1988; Miller, 1990). Resources (Kail, 198B),
conceptual )(:nowledge (Bjorklund, 1987), and metamemory
(Flavell, 1971) are implicated in preschoolers' faulty
strategy use, and developments in these areas are
associated with developments in strategic effectiveness
(Howe & O'Sullivan, 1990).
Preschoolers' Beliefs About strategic Memory
Metamemory (Flavell, 1971), refers to knOWledge and
awareness of memory. Metamemory involves children's
12
beliefs about their own and other's memory, including how
best to approach and complete a variety of different
memory tasks. Most research on children's metamemory 111.i!
involved school-aged children (Pressley et al., 1987),
and relatively few studies have focused on preschoolers.
Consequently. know relatively little about
preschoolers' beliefs about memory in general, or their
beliefs about strategic processing in particular
(Fabricius I< cavalier, 1989; Yussen I< Levy, 1975).
Nonetheless, preschoolers (10 have personal "theories"
about memory, theories that include beliefs about the
individual and combined effects of different variables on
memory (Naus & ornstein, 1983; Wellman, 1988) and these
bel iefs may influence preschoolers I strategy
(Fabricius & Hagen, 1984; 01Sullivan, 1993; Wellman,
1988) .
What do preschoolers believe about strategic memory?
For example, what do they believe about the need to be
strategic, and about how different strategies might help
or hinder their memory performance? Moreover, how do
these beliefs influence their strategic behaviour'?
Pressley at al. (1987) hypothesized that preschoolers
first come to believe that exerting effort (a general
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strategy) increases performance on memory tasks before
they understand that effort deployed into specific
strategies is usually better than hard work. This bellef
in amount of effort encourages continued strategic
effort, which eventually leads to the discovery of
specific strategies and beliefs about their
effectiveness. Although this illustrates the potentially
powerful influence of preschoolers' beliefs about
strategic effort on their strategic development, few
studies exist where these hypothesized relationships have
been investigated directly.
Most of what is known about preschoolers' beliefs
about strategic memory has been inferred from
preschoolers' study behaviour on memory tasks. For
example, recall that when instructed to remember,
preschoolers took a more deliberate approach to the
recall task in that they engaged in more study behaviours
(e.g., visual examination, rehearsal), and played
considerably less ~Iith the to-be-remembered items than
children instructed to play (Baker-Ward et al., 1984;
Deloache et a1., 1985; Lange et al., 1989; Wellman at al.
1975) . These behaviours have been interpreted as
evidence that young children believe that effC1rt
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facilitates memory and that they deliberately use effort
to help themselves on memory tasks (Wellman, 1988).
Studies such as these provide indirect evidence of
preschoolers' beliefs about the role of effort in memory
and suggest that they have some intelligent insights into
the relative importance of strategic effort during recall
tasks. Some of their bellefs may, however, be naive
(O'SUllivan, 1993). For example, on memory-for-Iocation
tasks 2- and 3-year-olds display numerous strategies,
such as pointing at the location of the hidden toy,
which in hindsight are unnecessary since most of these
children could easily locate the hidden toy even without
such painstaking strategic effort (Deloache at al.,
1985). Such needless expenditure of strategic effort
into faulty (i. e., unnecessary) strategies has been
interpreted as evidence that 2- and 3-year-old' s believe
memory is a process which always necessitates the use of
effort.
There are a few studies where children's beliefs
about effort have been measured directly. Findings
indicate that 5-year-olds believe that amount of effort
expended is one of the most important factors (1f not the
most important) in determining memory performance, and
,s
more important than the amount of information to be
remembered for example (Wellman, collins, & Glip.berman,
1981). Furthermore, preschoolers believe that the amount
of time spent studying or the effort exerted during study
is more important than how that time is spent or effort
used (i. e. , categorization strategies) (Fabricius &
Hagen, ~984).
It would seem that preschoolers believe that memory
requires effort and that their understanding of memory
effort is focused on quantity rather than quality (i.e.,
specific strategies) of effort e}(pended. How then, do
these beliefs influence preschoolers' strategic memory
beh<lviour and performance? The only study where this
issue was addressed directly wa!'; reported by O'Sullivan
(1993). In that study, 4-year-old's beliefs about the
influence of memory effort and anticipated reward value
on recall were examined, together with the actual effects
of effort and reward on recall. The results indicated
that the 4-year-olds believed they would work harder and
remember more if promised a high versus a low value
reward. However, it turned out that although reward did
effect effort expenditure as the sUbjects predicted
(Le., high reward elicited more looking at and attention
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to the to-be-remembered items than low re....ard),
differences in effort did not effect recall. ThUs, the
bellef that reward would influence effort was valid, but
the belief that effort would influence recall was naive
because increased effort (in the high reward condition)
was deployed into faulty strategies.
uslng a similar methodology, o'Sullivan (1994) also
demonstrated that preschoolers have valid beliefs about
the effects of interest on memory effort (4-year-olds use
more effort to remember interesting tlJan boring toys),
but naive beliefs about relations between effort and
recall (their extra efforts do not effect recall).
O'Sullivan (1993, 1994) concluded that beliefs about the
value of expending effort motivate preschr,olers to be
strategic on memory tasks. However, because they have
not Clstablished beliefs about the effectiveness of
deploying effort into specific strategies, their effort
is deployed into faulty, ineffective memory routines.
How do children develop their beliefs both accurate
and naive, about strategic memory effort? The value of
effort appears to be embedded in many social demands
placed on children (O'Sullivan, 1993; Wellman, 1988).
Hard work 1s considered to be pivotal to success in North
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American culture and adults communicate this message to
children over and over again (Stipek & MacIver, 1989).
Thus, it is not surprising that children believe effort
is important for memory. It is also not surprising that
preschoolers elOpha:;ize the amount of their efforts rather
than how that effort i~ specifically apr'led. After all,
they are frequently told that hard work and exerting a
lot of effort will be rewarded with success, rather than
that effort applied through efficient strategies is more
effective than effort alone (O'Sullivan, 1993). For
example, in preschool, teachers encourage children to try
hard or do their best. Furthermore, teachers generally
reward effort rather t.han performance outcomes (e.g., the
result of the efforts). The message being conveyed to
North American children is that try ing your best and
working as hard as you can will lead to success and
reward. It seems that preschoolers understand thesl'.l
messages and they have established beliefs about effort,
rel"ard value, and effort-reward-performance relations
consistent with these messages (Danner & Lanky, 19811
O'Sullivan, 1993, 1994: Schwarz, Schrager, & Lyons,
1983). Because adults tend to place little emphasis on
how effort can best be deployed to maximize performance,
18
it is not unreasonable that amount of effort figures
significantly in preschool~rs' beliefs about how to
facilitate recall. What th~is means, however, is that
when tl'anslated into strate~.ic behaviour, preschoolers
would know how to work harder but not necessarily how to
work better to increase their recall.
In summary, preschoolers have established beliefs
about the impact of strategic effort on recall
performance. Conclusions inferred from their strategy
behaviour during recall tasks suggest that they believe
effort can increase recall, and that effort is a useful
tool to ensure r"!membering (O'SUllivan, 1993; Pressley et
al., 1981; Wellman et al., 1981). Findings from studies
Io.'here preschoolers I bel iefs about strateg ic effort were
measured directly converge on the same conclusion, 4-
year-olds believe working harder will insul superior
recall. This belief turns out to be naive however. This
is because when preschoolers try harder to remember they
channel their efforts into strategies that do not payoff
in terms of superior recall. Thus, the belief that
effort is helpful may motivate children to try, but they
are unlikely to try effectively until they understand
19
that ho.... effort is deployad is just as important as how
much (O'Sullivan, 1993, 1994).
The Present Study
Two specific questions were addressed. First, what
do preschoolers believe about the individual and combined
effects of effort and anticipated reward value on recall?
Second, do these bel iefs accurately represent the actual
relations between these variables? Two experiments were
conducted to address these questions. In Experiment 1
preschoolers I beliefs about the influence of high and low
memory effort and high and low anticipated reward on
recall were examined. The prediction was that
preschoolers would believe that recall increases with
increasing effort and reward value, and that increases in
reward value would elicit increased effort leading to
higher recall. This prediction is consistent with
findings from previous studies on preschoolers' beliefs
about the effects of effort and reward value on meraory
(O'Sullivan, 1993, 1994).
In Experiment 2 the validity of these beliefs was
examined, the question being would preschoolers work
harder and remember more if promised a high versus low
'0
value prize? consistent with findings from previous
studies (e.g., Baker-Ward et a1., 1984; Lange et a1.,
1989; O'Sullivan, 1993, 1994) the prediction was that
preschoolers would exert more effort (as evidenced by
time spent in study and use of strategic memory
behaviours) when promised a high value reward, but
whether these differential strategic efforts would lead
to superior recall was considered doubtful,
significant strategy-recall relations in preschoolers are
not usuallj obtained for preschoolers.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment, preschoolers' beliefs about the
influence of high versus low memory effort and high
versus low anticipated re.....ard value on recall were
examined. It was predicted that the preschoolers would
believe that recall increases with increasing effort and
reward value, and that reward value influences the amount
of effort exerted on a recall task (i.e., a high value
reward elicits high effort and a low value reward elicits
low effort) .
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Method
SUbjects. Subjects were 20 preschool children (9
male, 11 female) aged 4 years 0 months to 4 years 9
months (Illean age • 4 years. 5 months; S. D. '" 3.04
months). All sUbjects attended a part-time preschool
program located in St. John's, Newfoundland. The
children were from middle income backgrounds and their
participation was secured by written parental consent.
Materials. Four black-and-ydlow line drawings (20
x 16 em each) were used. Each depicted a child sitting
behind a table on which there were ten toys displayed in
a semi-circular I'lrray. The toys were: a watch, horse,
culJ, sunglasses, book, camera, doll, scissors, airplane,
and a ball. Two or the drawings were designed to
represent high versus low memory effort, with effort
being manipulated through the facial expression of the
child in the drawinq (see Appendix A). High effort was
portrayed by a facial expression with tightly knitted
eyebrows, a sharply downturned mouth and beads of
perspiration falling from the head, whereas, low effort
W;JS represented by slight knitting of thQ brows and
downturning of thQ mouth. The two remaining drawings
were designed to represent high and low anticipated
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reward value. Each of these drawings (see Appendix A)
displayed a child ....ithout facial features or facial
expression. Either a package of crayons or a pencil was
drawn in the lo....er right hand corner I indicating the
prize (crayons or a pencil) that the pictured child could
win. Previous testing with 28 preschoolers had elicited
unanimous agreement that the crayons were a better prize
than the pencil (see Appendix B). Two sets of ten toys
identical to those shown in the line drawings were also
used.
Procedure. The SUbjects accompanied
individually by a female experimenter to a quiet room in
the preschool. Each SUbject was first familiarized with
the memory task depicted in the drawings. With both the
subject and experimenter sitting together on the floor,
the experimenter demonstrated what she described as a
memory game frequently played at children's parties. She
placed ten toys in a semi-circle in front of the SUbject
and explained that she would soon take them away, and
that the subject should try to remember what they were.
Then, she withdrew the toys and asked the SUbjects what
toyc they could remember. When the SUbjects had finished
recall they proceeded to three trials, a memory effort
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trial, an anticipated reward value trial, and an effort-
reward cotlbination trial. The order of presentation of
the first two trials was counterbalanced across subjects,
but the effort-reward combination trial was always
administered last.
1. Memory lUlort Trial. Subjects were shown th'!
two drawings representing memory effort and told that the
children (described as the same age and sex as the
individual sUbject) in the pictures were playing the
memory game the sUbject had played minutes before (see
Appendix C). The experimenter, while referring to the
facial expression of the children in the drawings,
described one as tt"ying a whole lot and the other as
trying a little to remember the toys. Then as a
manipulation check, sUbjects were asked to identify which
child was trying a lot and a little. All sUbjects
correctly identified the appropriate dra.wings. Next, the
experimenter placed two sets of ten toys, identical to
those pictured in the drawings, around each drawing. She
asked the sUbjects to select the toys that the child who
was trying a lot would remember and the toys the child
who was trying a little would remember (counter-
balanced). When flubjects had made their selections the
"
experimenter restated their predictions and asked for
confirmation. Then the drawings and the toys were
removed.
2. Anticipated Reward Value Trial. Children's
estimates of recall for the different reward values were
obtained using the same procedure. SUbjects were shown
the two drawings depicting reward value and told that the
children in the drawings were playing the memory game
(see Appendix C). This time they were informed that one
child could win a box of crayons for remembering a lot of
the toys. The SUbjects were also told that the child in
that drawing believed the crayons to be a great prize and
really wanted to win them. The child in the other
drawing could win a pencil for remembering a lot of the
toys. However, sUbjects were told that this child
considered pencils to be just an OK prize because he/she
had many pencils already, and consequently did not really
care if he/she won the pencil or not. As a manipUlation
check the subject was asked to identify the child who
would win the great prize and the child who would win the
OK prize. All subjects made the correct identification.
A set of tQys identical to those in the drawings, was
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then laid out for each drawing and sllbjects' recall
estimates obtained as before.
3. Effort-Reward Combination Trial. Finally, the
experimenter laid out the reward value cards, described
them again and pointed out that the children in those
drawings had no facial features (see Appendix C).
SUbjects were told that they should give each child a
face. The effort cards were then presented and described
and the SUbjects were asked to put the right card/face
(i. e., trying a little or a lot) on the child playing for
the great prize and the child playing for the OK prize
(counterbalanced) . When the sUbjects made their
placements, the experimenter restated their choices, laid
a set of toys around each pair of two pictures and asked
children to estimate recall.
Resul ts and Discuss.ion
Two questions were addressed in the analyses.
First, the number of children who made the "correct"
jUdgements about effort and anticipated reward value, and
effort and anticipated reward combinations,
determined. Second, the effects of manipulating effort,
anticipated reward value, and effort-reward combinations,
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on the number of toys subjects predicted would be
recalled was examined. Because preliminary analyses
indicated no significant effects for trial order (I.e.,
whether the effort or reward value trial was administered
first), sUbsequent analyses were collapsed across this
variable.
The majority of sUbjects, 16 (out of 20) judged that
high effort would lead to superior recall than low
effort, X2(1) • 7.2, P <.01. Of the remaining four
subjects, three predicted that recall in the low effort
condition would be higher than in the high effort
condition, whereas the fourth sUbject estimated equal
recall 1n both the high and low effort conditions. The
majority of sUbjects, 17, also judged that an anticipated
reward of high value would lead to superior recall
relative to an anticipated reward of low value, Xl (l) -
9.8, P <.01. The ather three SUbjects estimated equal
recall in the high and laW reward value conditions.
Eighteen of the SUbjects jUdged that a high value
reward would elicit high effort and a low value reward
would elicit low effort, Xl (l) .. 12.8, P <.001. Of the
18 subjects who made these "correct" effort r.eward value
pairings, 17 then judged that the high effort-high value
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pair would produce higher recall than the low effort-low
value combination, X2(1) = 14.22, P <.001. The
eighteenth sUbject estimated equal recall in the high
effort-high reward and low effort-low reward conditions.
As predicted then, most sUbjects believed that recall
would increase with increased effort or reward value and
that high reward value would elicit high effort and
result in higher recall than low effort combined with low
reward value.
NeKt, the effects of the task varlableti (i.e.,
effort, reward value, both) and their magnitUde on the
number of items subjects predicted would be recalled was
analyzed with ill 2 (magnitude: high v low) x J (task
variable: effort v reward value v both) repeated measures
analysis of variance. Data froUl the two subjects who
"incorrectly" paired high effort with low anticipated
reward value and low effort with high anticipated reward
value, were excluded froUl this anal:/si6. A significant
effect emerged tor magnitude, indicating that the
preschoolers predicted significantly qreater recall in
conditions of high magnitude (mean" 7.56), in comparison
to low magnitude (mean" 3.85), F(I,17) .. 274.93,
P <.001. No significant effects emerged for task
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variable and the task variable x magnitude interaction
was not statistically significant.
The prediction that preschoolers would believe that
recall increases with increasing effort and reward value,
and that reward value effects the amount of strategic
effort exerted on a rCicall task, was supported by thes\:.
results. Overall, the results indicated that most of the
preschoolers believed that (1) high effort would produce
significantly more recall than low effort: (2) children
promised a high value reward would recall more items than
children promised a low value reward: (3) a high value
reward would elicit greater effort than a low-value
reward; and (4) the combination of high value and high
effort would result in significantly greater recall than
the low value-low effort combination. These findings
indicate that 4-year-olds have beliefs about the effects
of effort, anticipated reward value, and their
combination on recall, and also have established beliefs
about the impact of reward value on effort expenditure
during a recall task.
An interesting outcome from these findings pertains
to preschoolers' recall predictions for the effort-reward
value combinations. They predicted equivalent recall for
2.
both the individual (effort or reward) and pain~d
(effort-reward combination) variables. The reasoning
behind these predictions is not clear. However, it
appears that these preschoolers did not add the effects
of effort and reward value together when predicting
recall in the combined condition. Wellman et a1. (1981)
indicated that young children's recall predictions seem
to be founded on effort considerations, suggesting that
the preschoolers in this experiment may ha<,e believed
that rewards work through effort to influence recall.
o I Sullivan (1993) has suggested that predictions
involving reward value alone or in combination with
effort may be driven by the belief that the intluence of
reward value on recall is indirect and mediated through
effort. Clearly, these issues ",lemand further study.
EXPERIMEtn' 2
How valid are preschoolers' beliefs about the
effects of effort, anticipated reward value, and their
combination, on recall? Because the beliefs demonstrated
in Experiment 1 probably reflect childrens' real life
experiences with effort-reward-performance relations
(Stipek & MacIver. 1989), it was expected that sUbj·.!cts
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who anticipated a high value rewar.d would exert
effort during studjl than those promised a low value
re'...ard. That is, subjects who anticipated a high value
reward were expected to study longer and demonstrate
different levels of strategic activity (e.g .• label the
to-be-remembered stimuli more) than those promised a la'll
value reward. Whether these differences in study effort
would translate into recall differences was doubtful.
This is because in most previous studies variations in
preschoolers' study behaviour was not 3ssociated with
reliable differences in recall (e.g., Baker-Wc,'d et al.,
1984, O'sullivan, 1993).
Method
SUbjects. SUbjects were 32 preschool children (11
male, 21 female) aged 3 years 5 months to 5 years 6
months (mean age - -4 years, 2 months; S.D. = 6.25
months). All SUbjects attended either full-time or part-
time programs conducted by six preschool centres located
in St. John's, Newfoundland. Subjects were from middle
income backgrounds and their participation was secured
with written parental consent. Each child was randomly
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assigned to one of two reward conditions: high or low
anticipated reward value.
Materials. The stimuli were 15 uniform-sized
(approximately three inches square), categorically
different toys. The toys used were: a watch, a pack of
cards, a waterpistol, a screwdriver, a doll, a horse, a
mirror, a balloon, a ball, a camera, scissors, airplane,
cup, sunglasses, and a book. A box of crayons
representing a high value reward and a pencil
representing a low value reward were also used.
Procedure. All of the sUbjects were individually
tested in a familiar room in their preschool centre by a
female experimenter. The subject was seated at a small
table next to the experimenter. First, sUbjects were
told that they would be shown a group of toys and would
have to remember them (see Appendix 0). SUbjects were
instructed to do anything they liked to remember the
toys. Then, each child was shown either the crayons or
the pencil. SUbjects shown the crayons were told "if you
do really well, I will give you this package of crayons.
Everyone just loves the crayons, they think they're just
great". SUbjects shown the pencil were told "if you do
really well, I will give you this pencil for a prize".
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(Of course, on completion of their participation, all
children were given both prizes.)
Next, the experimenter put away the prize and
subjects were given three study-distracter-test trials.
The 15 toys were positioned in a semi-circle before the
child, and the experimenter named each toy as it was
placed. Subjects were reminded to do anything they
wished to remember the toy, and they were instructed to
tell the experimenter when they were ready for the recall
test. The study trial proceeded until the child
indicated that he/she was ready for the recall test or
until four minutes, 15 3econds had elapsed, Whichever
came first. To eliminate short-term memory effects a 20
second distracter task followed in which the subject drew
X I sand 0 I S on a sheet of paper. The recall trial
proceeded until no new items were recalled within a 10
second interval. At the end of the third test trial a
manipUlation check was used. Subjects were asked to
recall the reward they had beG" promised for remembering
the toys. All subjects recalled their prize. A video
camera recorded each sUbject's entire performance.
3J
Results and Discussion
Recall PerrorlM.nce. The first row of Table 1
contains the means for recall by reward condition and
trial. The number of toys recalled was analyzed with a
2 (reward: high v low) x 3(trial: 1 v 2 v 3) analysis of
variance, in which reward was a between sUbjects variable
and trial a repeated measuro;!. Reward had a significant
effect, Fel, 30) "" 7.71, P <.01, such that sUbjects
recalled more toys when promised a high (mean ""' 7 .15)
relative to a low value reward (mean .. 5.79). No
significant effect was obtained for trial, llInd the reward
x trial interaction was not significant.
Study Tlae. The second row of Table 1 contains the
means for study time in each reward condition on each of
the three trials. A 2(reward: high vs. low) x 3(trial:
1 vs. 2 vs. 3) analysis of variance was used to analyze
study time. Here, re....ard was a between sUbjects variable
and trial a repeated measure. No siqnificant effects
emerged. Although visual inspection of these Il\eans
suggests that study time increased across trials in the
low value reward condition, and decreased across trial~
in the high value reward condition, there was
considerable individual vari~tion in study time for both
TABLE 1
Means for Recall, Study Time, and Proportion of Observation Blocks in
which Each Coded Study Behavior Occurred, by Reward Condition and Trial
Reward
Low Value
Trial I Trial 2 Trial 3
High Value
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
Recall 5.63 6.19 5.56 7.00 6.88
Study Time (seconds) 99.81 75.81 123.63 107.13 104.50 95.30
Visual Examination .88 .89 .9' .91 .92 .91
Object Manipulation .37
." .5' .35 .42 .57
Naming .22 .28 .22 .35 .39 .28
Semantic Play .10 .18 .17 .12 .12 .22
Off-task Behavior .19 .17 .10 .18 .13 .1'
Unfilled Time .07 .02 .01 .01 .01 .04
Verbal Elaboration .03 .02 .00 .01
N "" It- in each condition 'i-
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reward conditions (low value range'"' 3 - 254 seconds:
high val ue range = 22 - 252 seconds), contributing to the
insignificant statistical findings.
Study Behaviou..:- Measurement. For each sUbject, each
of the three stUdy trials was divided into five second
segments. For each five second segment, seven behaviours
were scored as either present or absent. The seven study
behaviours examined were: visual examination, object
manipulation, semantic play, naming, verbal elaboration,
unfilled time, and off-task behaviour (Baker-Ward et aI,
1984; Lange et aI, 1989: O'SUllivan, 1.993). They were
defined as follows. Visual examination occurred when tile
child visually scanned the array of toys or focused on
particular items. Object manipulation occurred when the
child touched, lifted, moved, or grouped the objects.
Semantic play occurred when the child manipulated the
toys in a manner that engaged their basic properties (eg.
trotting the horse; drinking out of the teacup). Naming
occurred when the child verbalized the names of any toy.
Verbal elaboration included any talk about the toys which
went beyond simply naming (eg., "I have a camera at
horne"). Off-task behaviour occurred when the child
attended to an identifiable stimulus not central to the
3.
task (e.g., a child was off-task when out of his/her seat
or making faces at the examiner). Unfilled time occurred
when the child was neither in contact with the toys nor
distracted by off-task stimuli.
Two observers independently coded the study
behaviours for 12 randomly selected sUbjects. The mean
interrater agreement was 94. 4%: (range = 84\ - 100%)
across behaviours. Cases of disagreement were resolved
by discussion between the two raters. Next, the number
of five second blocks in which each of the seven
behaviours occurred was calculated separately for each
trial and SUbject. Finally, these figures were converted
to proportions.
study Behaviour Analyses. The last seven rows of
Table 1 show the mean proportion of observation blocks in
which each behaviour occurred by reward condition and
trial. Following tradition in this area of research and
based on the recommendations in HUberty and Morris (l989)
these data were analyzed using seven separate 2 (reward:
high v low) x 3(trial: 1 v 2 v 3) analyses of variance -
one for each study behav iour. Here, reward is a between
SUbjects variable and trial a repeated measure. No
significant effects emerged from the analyses of visual
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examination, naming, semantic play, verbal elaboration,
off-task behaviour, or unfilled time. Trlal had a
significant effect on object manipulation, F(2,60) ""
6.78, P <.01. Post-hoc analysis with Tukey' s HSO Test
(Ferguson, 197G) indicated that object manipulation
increased sign1 ficantly from Trial 1 (mean = .3595) to
Trial 2 (mean'" .4183) to Trial 3 (mean'" .5660).
Correlations were computed between recall and each
of the seven study behaviours, separately for each trial
and reward condition (see Table 2). Few significant
relationships between recall and study behaviour were
found. Exceptions were the significant correlation
coefficients obtained between recall and naming on trial
one, and recall and off-task behaviour on both trials
two, and three in the high reward value condition. This
means, of course, that recall increased as naming the
toys increased and as off-task behaviour decreased in
that condition. The only significant correlation in the
low reward condition occurred between recaJ,l and verbal
elaboration on trial two, meaning that recall increased
as verbal comments about the toys increased on that
trial.
TABLE 2
Correlations between Recall and Each of the Coded
Study Behaviours by Reward Condition and Trial
~
~
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
High Value
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
Visual Examination .0' .27 .15 .17 .35 .25
Object Manipulation
Naming .10 .• 5 -.02 .49* .37 .2'
semantic Play -.09 -.26 -.13 -.33 .0' .01
Off-task Behavior -.24 -.29 -.37 -.06 -.51* -.51*
Unfilled Time .2' .02 .33 .1' -.15
Verbal Elaboration -.16 .49* -.05 .07 -.17 -.07
N = 16 in each condition
* I! < .05. \;\
J9
Correlations were computed between all seven coded
study behaviours in order to reveal any relationships
among these behaviours. The correlation values between
study behaviours on trial three are shown in Table 3, for
the high value condition, and in Table 4 for the loW'
value reward condition. Seven significant correlations
emerged in the high value condition, whereas, only three
were obtained in the low value condition. In both
conditions, visual examination was inversely related to
off-task behaviour, naming was inversely related to
semantic play, and object manipulation positively related
to semantic play. In the high value condition, positive
relationships were found between visual examination and
Object manipulation, and between off-task behaviour and
unfilled time, as well as, negative relationships between
object manipulation and off-task behi'lviour, and semantic
play and off-task behaviour. No other significant
relationships emerged, sU9geoting that the preschoolers
often used one or another of these behav iours rather than
combining one or more at a time (Lange et 031., 1989).
The hypothesis in this exveriment was that
preschoolers who anticipated a high value reward would
exert more effort (as evidenced by time spent in study
TABLE 3
Correlations between Each of the Coded Study
Behaviours on Trial Three in the High Value Condition
Study Behaviour
Visual Examination
Mean'" • 9078
Object Manipulation
Mean'" . 5743
Naming
Mean '"
Semantic Play
Mean - .2192
Off-task Behavior
Mean = .1412
Unfilled Time
Mean = .0433
Verbal Elaboration
Mean = .0363
N "" 16 in each condition
* I! < .05.
** R < .01.
V.E. D.M.
. 70**
S.P. D.T.B. U.T. VR.E.
-.84** -.17 .25
.69** -.75** -.46 .32
-.62** -.08 -.16 -.29
-.50* -.29 -.14
.51* .2.
-.13
g
TABLE 4
Correlations between Each of the Coded study
Behaviours on Trial Three in the Low Value Condition
study Behaviour
Visual Examination
Mean - .9550
Object Manipulation
Hean = .5578
Naming
Hean = .2189
Semantic Play
Mean = .1705
Off-task Behavior
Hean = .0954
Unfilled Time
Mean - .0083
Verbal Elaboration
Hean = .0030
N = 16 in each condition
* I! < .05.
HI!. < .01.
V.E. a.M.
-.03 .22
-.21
s.P.
.04
.77**
-.52*
O.T.B.
-.79**
-.29
.01
U.T.
.15
-.34
-.26
-.04
VR.E.
.03
.27
-.07
.31
-.05
-.10
{':
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and use of strategic m~mory behaviours) during study than
those promised a low value reward, but would not recall
more. These hypotheses were not supported. Instead, the
resul ts indicated that preschoolers, in fact, recto.lled
more toys when promised a high value reward in comparison
with a low value reward, and that neither study time nor
study behaviour differed between the two reward value
groups. Thus, reward influenced recall but did not
significantly effect effort deployment during study.
Why did the SUbjects in the high value reward group
recall significantly more toys than SUbjects in the low-
value reward group when there was no difference in the
measured stUdy time and behav iour displayed by these two
groups? A number of factors which were not measured in
the present experiment may have influenced the superior
recall displayed by the high value reward group. It is
possible that covert strategies such as internal
labelling/rehearsal strategies without accompanying
vocalized or overt indicators may have been employed to
a greater extent by SUbjects in the high value (crayons)
condi tion than SUbjects in the low-value (pencil)
condition. However, the use of such covert strategies by
preschoolers is unlikely (Wellman, 1988).
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It is also possible that coordination of strategies
(e.g., looking while touching and naming) rather than
individual strategies may have led to superior recall.
The greater number of significant correlational
relationships found between study behaviours in the high
value condition indirectly support the hypothesis that
coordination of strategies may have positively influenced
recall. currently, there are no conceptual models to
direct the measurement of preschoolers I use of multiple
study strategies. The need to develop such models to
investigate how the coordination of strategies impacts on
recall has been noted by others (Baker-Ward et al.,
1984). This situation is further complicated by the
tinding that children take many al ternative approaches to
study on memory tasks, and that no particular pattern of
behaviours is systematically related to recall (Baker-
Ward et a1., 1984). This rllises a challenge for future
research efforts.
Retrieval effort may also have played a role in the
higher recall scores obtained by SUbjects in the high
value reward condition. Hudson & Fivush (1983) reported
that children' s ability to use strat:!gies to guide
retrieval deliberately. develops considerably during the
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preschool and school years. There is considerable
evidence that, across childhood, developments in
retrieval. are much more pronounced than developments in
storage (Howe, Brainerd, & Kingma, 1985). In view of
this, it seems likely that differences in retrieval
efforts may have influenced the higher recall obtained by
sUbjects in the high value reward condition in this
experiment. The preschoolers may have exerted more
effort to retrieve the names of the toys they had stored
in their memory when anticipating a high value reward
relative to a reward of low value. This hypothesis
should be pursued in future research.
The findings in this Experiment that reward
influenced recall but not study effort can be contrasted
with o'Sullivan's (1993) findings that reward influenced
study effort, but not recalL First, consider the
finding that reward affected recall here but not in
0' Sullivan (1993). Methodol<..qical differences between
these two experiments may account for the differences in
findings. For example, in this Experiment SUbjects were
only shown the prize they could win. That is, SUbjects
in the high value reward condition were only shown a
package. of crayons. SUbjects in the low-value condition
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were only shown a pencil. Subjects in O'Sullivan's
(1993) study, on the other hand, were shown both rewords,
regardless of reward-value group assignment. That is,
they were shown both the pencil and the box of crayons
and told which of the two prizes they were playing for.
Perhaps displaying both rewards created
misunderstanding for the SUbjects in O'Sullivan's (1993)
study. For example, the SUbjects in the low reward
condition might have believed that they could win the
b3tter prize if they did really well on the recall task.
consequently, they may have exerted e){tra effort at
retrieval which contributed to recall equivalent to that
in the high reward value condition.
Now consider the finding that reward did not effect
study effort in this study but did in O'Sullivan (1993).
O'Sullivan (1993) reminded SUbjects after each trial
about the prize they could win. The preschoolers in the
present experiment were not given any reminder during the
three trials. O'Sullivan's (1993) procedure may have
influenced motivation at the start of each trial and
resulted in higher study effort in the high reward
condition. In the present experiment, when sUbjects were
not reminded they did not display different study effort.
"
Again, this supports the hypothesis that recall
differences between the high and low reward conditions in
the present experiment were due to retrieval effort.
Interestingly, as pointed out earlier, O'Sullivan's
(1993) high reward sUbjects did not recall more despite
their use of different study effort. Thus, their
strategies were faulty or ineffective, and as a result
their strategic effort was not reflected in their
subsequent recall scores (Miller, 1990; O'SUllivan, 19931
Wellman, 1988).
An interesting "non-f.inding" in this experiment was
that recall did not differ signif;-::antly across trials.
This is unusual because sUbjects usually demonstrate
learning gains over three trials. The experimental
methodology may have contributed to thj s effect.
SUbjects in this experiment were not informed in advance
that they would have three chance~ to reca11 the toys.
Therefore, they may have considered each trial to be
their only or final chance to win their prize.
O'Sullivan (1993) using a similar task told SUbjects they
would have three trials and obtained significant
increases in recall across trials. The effects of
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telling/not telling sUbjects the number of recall trials
they will have should be investigated in future studies.
Finally, the finding that reward value influenced
recall is consistent with previous research in which
reward value positively affected recall in young school-
age children (Danner & Lonky, 1981). In that study, as
here, the mechanisms responsible for this effect is not
clear and should be pursued in future research. The role
of retrieval processes in mediating the effects of reward
on recall should receive empirical attention.
GENERAL DIscU.SarON
The present stUdy was designed to investigate
preschoolers' beliefs about the influence of effort and
reward on recall, and to examine the validity of those
beliefs. Findings from Experinlent 1 clearly demonstrate
that preschoolers believe that (1) increased effort leads
to increased recall; (2) increased reward leads to
increased recall; (3) high reward value elicits high
effort and low reward value low effort; and (4) the
combination of high effort and high reward value leads tu
superior recall relative to the low effort-reward
combination. The validity of those beliefs was assessed
••
in Experiment 2. The bel iet that recall performance
increases when expecting a hig-h-value reward in
comparison ....ith a reward of low value was validated in
Experiment 2. SUbjects promised the crayons recalled
significantly more toys than SUbjects pro.ised a penciL
However, the belief that preschoolers would exert more
effort (as evidenced by differences in study and study
time) when promised a high value reward than 'When
promised a low value reward was not validated. No
statistical differences in study time or behaviour in
high and low reward conditions were ohtained. Overall,
preschoolers' beliefs about the effects of reward
recall were valid, but beliefs about the effects of
reward on effort were naive.
These findings are important for a nullber of
First they illustrate that preschoolers can
demonstrate valid beliefs when asked about variables
important in their lives - in this case relations between
reward value and recall. The preschoolers were able to
accurately jUdge the effect of reward value on recall,
most likely because they were asked about a variable that
is important in their everyday experience. Young
children are promised rewards as an incentive to stay on
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task or to behave well (e.g., prollising a cookie
re....ard for doing as you've been told to do) (Stipek ,
MacIver, 1989). Furthermore, they are able to adapt
their behaviour in response to variation in reward value,
indicating the powerful influence and relative importance
of preschoolers I beliefs about reward value (Danner &
Lanky, 1981; O'sullivan, 1993; Schwarz et al., 1983).
Second, the findings illustrate that preschoolers'
also have naive beliefs. These include the beliefs that
children 10'111 work harder for a good prize and that hard
work ...,i11 result in superior recall. (Of course, it is
possible that this belief is valid, and that increased
retrieval effort (not measured here) leads to superior
recall.) The findinl} that sUbjects believed reward would
effect effort when it did not, is contrary to the
hypotheses advanced in this stUdy. It had been predicted
that increased reward value would be associated with
increased effort, but that these increased efforts would
be deployed into faulty utilization deficient strategies.
How can the current findings be explained and what are
the implications for strategic development in
preschoolers?
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Although speCUlative it seems likely that the age of
the subjects (in this relative to similar studies
(O'SUllivan, 1993, 1994; Baker-Ward at al., 1984~ Lange
et al., 1989) is very important. The sUbj eets in
Experiment 2 were an average of four months younger than
those in O'Sullivan's (1993) study on reward, effort, and
recall. It may be that young 4-year-olds approach these
tasks automatically and do not try to manipulate their
strategic effort deliberately, whez'eas older 4-year-olds
are beginning to tryout their strategic routines.
Furthertl'lore, consistent with Miller's suggestions (1990),
when children first begin to manipulate strategi'<!s
deliberately, their strategic efforts may actually
interfere with recall. What this means is that the older
4-year-olds in 0 I Sullivan (1993, 1994) may have
neutralized the enhancing eff'~cts of high reward and high
interest on their recall because of their attempts to
vary effort. It follows that the young 4-year-olds in
this stUdy, who did not manipUlate their strategic effort
in response to reward value experienced the automatic
positive influence of reward on their recall performance
(Danner & Lanky, 19B1). clearly, research concentrated
on developments between the ages of three and five is
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needed to elucidate on preschoolers' strategic effort
development, including their beliefs about effort.
How do preschoolers develop their beliefs about
effort? Social mechanisms very likely contribute. As
mentioned in the introduction, beliefs about the value of
effort may well be a by-product of the socialization
process. Children are encouraged to try hard'i!r by their
parents, well-meaning individuals, television programs,
story books, and even nursery rhymes (e.g., "if at first
you don't succeed, try, try again"). Parents and
preschool teachers control and direct many of the
learning experiences to which children are exposed, and
adults also impart knowledge and advice during these
learning experiences. Preschoolers in North America are
very likely influenced by the continuous emphasis on
llmount of effort by the adults in their lives. usually
little advice about~ is passed along, so the
focus i.s on quantity rather than quality of effort.
Preschoolers' beliefs about memory, therefore, may be
based in large measure on their personal experiences,
especially what they have been told by the individuals
with whom they have contact.
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These practises may have important implications for
children's strategic and metacognitive development. For
example. in Germany where teachers stress the importance
of how effort is deployed into strategic behaviour,
children display sophisticated strategic memory behaviour
at an earlier age than American children (Kurtz,
schneider, Carr, Borko\olski. & Rellinger, 1990). Here in
North America, teachers tend to stress the importance of
amount rather than type of effort (strategic). Since
North American preschoolers appear to develop naive
beliefs based on what they are told by adults and the
media, more appropriate messages could potentially
produce more sophisticated strategy use by North American
children at the same age as their German peers.
In conClusion, the results of this study clearly
indicate that at 4-years-of-age, prior to the start of
school, children have well developed beliefs concerning
some of the variables that affect memory. Some of those
beliefs are valid and some naive, and they have important
implications for children's memory behaviour and
peri'ormance. As these beliefs likely develop from a
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social base, the role of social and cultural ....ariables In
metamemory development should be explored in future
research.
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Appendix 1\:
Line Drawings Used in Experiment 1
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Appendix B:
pilot Study of Preschoo1ers' Reward Preferences
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Purpose
To establish a concrete prize that has a high value
relative to a prize that has low value for 4-year-olds.
Method
Subjects. SUbjects were 28 preschool children (13
male, 15 temale) aged 41 months to 66 months (mean age =
52 months). All subjects attended either full-time or
part-time programs in preschool centres located in st.
John 1 s , NFLD. Written parental consent
~rerequisite for participation in the study.
Materia.!s. Seven prhe pairs including: penny vs
dollar coin, pencil vs pacKage of crayons, four sheets of
blank paper vs colouring book, plastic harmonica vs
windwheel, bag of pretzels vs bag of chips (equal
proportioned), two Cabbage Patch stickers va two Teenage
Mutant Ninja Turtle badges, and 25 M&M candy pieces vs 25
mini-marshmallows.
Design and procedure. All SUbjects were tested
individually. Each child was told that their assistance
was required to choose prizes for children their o\oln age.
Each of the seven prize pairs was then shown to the child
in random order and the child was asked which member of
the pair would be the best prize.
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Resu~ t:s
Preference ratios for reward pairs were as follows:
pencil vs package of crayons, 1:27, penny vs dollar coin.
2:26~ four sheets blank paper vs colouring book, 4:24;
pretzels vs potato chips, 7: 21; two stickers vs two
badges, 7:21; harmonica vs windwheel, 15:131 M&M's vs
marshmallows, 15: 13. Since the greatest discrimination
between members of a pair was obtained when comparing the
poncil vs package of crayons, this pair was selected.
Appendix c:
soript: For Expe:. .-iment 1
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Proce~ure
All children were tested while sitting on the floor
of a separate room in their daycare. The following
symbols identify the experimenter and sUbjects: E =
experimenter, S = sUbject.
1. Familiarization with the task:
E: "Do you ever play memory games?".
E: "Well let me show you one that I play with
some boys and girls your age. Some people
play this game at birthday parties".
(Present toys - give instructions).
Instructions: "I have a bag of toys here
(show bag) and I playa memory game with
them. What I do is lay all of my toys out in
front of them like this for a few minutes
then I take them all away so that they can't
see them and ask them what the toys were. I
bet you can do that. Let' 5 try".
(Pick up all toys and put out of sight).
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"Now can you tell me what some of the toys
were?"
(Allow them a few seconds for recall).
2. Questions About Effort:
E: (Present two effort cards) "Here are
two boys/girls the same age as you and they
are playing my memory game. Look at their
faces (point to faces). This boy/girl (point
to face) is trying a whole lot to remember
the toys. Look at his/her face (point to
face). He/she is trying a whole lot to
remember the toys. Now look at the other
boy/girl's face (point to face). He/she is
only trying a little bit to remember the
toys. Show me the boy/girl \~ho is trying a
whole lot to remember the toys (child points
to picture - correct him/her if wrong). Show
me the boy/girl who is trying a little (child
points to picture - correct him/her if
wrong). (Place out the two sets of toys.
One set in a semi-circle around each
picture). Show me how many the boy/girl
who is trying a whole lot will rernember ll
(point to picture). Take out the toys you
think he/she will be able to remember. Show
me how many the boy/girl who is only trying
a little bit will remember (point to
picture). Take out the toys you think he/she
will be able to remember. Okay, so the
boy/girl who is trying a whole lot will
remember (state predicted number of toys) of
the toys and this boy/girl who is only trying
a little bit will remember (state predicted
number) of them" (Point to appropriate picture.
Remove all pictures and toys out of 3ight).
J. Questions About Value:
E: (Present two value cards) "Here are two other
boys/girls. They are playing the memory game
too. But they are playing it a little
different. They are playing for prizes like
you do at birthday parties. See the box of
crayons/pencil? He can win the crayons/pencil
if he/she does really good at the game and
remembers a lot of the toys. This boy/girl
thinks the crayons are a really great prize
and he/she wants to win them a whole lot. This
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boy/girl thinks that the pencil is an okay
prize. He/she already has a lot of pencils at
home and he/she does not care if he/she wins
it or not. Show me which boy/girl is playing
for the great prize (child responds - correct
if wrong). Show me which boy/girl is playing
for the okay prize (child responds - correct
if wrong).
(Layout all of the toys and follow procedure
for predictions as with effort. Remove all
toys and cards out of sight).
4. Questions About Value x Effort:
E: (Present value cards first).
"Here are two more boys/girls playing my game".
(Reiterate the description and questions about
the value cards). Do you notice something
missing on these boys/girls? That's right,
they have no faces do they? Well let's give
them some faces. (Present effort cards).
This face is trying a whole lot to remember the
toys and this face is only trying a little bit.
Put the right faces on these (point to the
value cards) boys/girls. Which boy/girl is
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trying a whole lot to remember (hOld up card)
and which one is only trying a little bit?
(Hold out cards to child - child places
cards. Restate the child's pairings and with
the superimposed pictures present the toys as
before and get predictions as per previous
procedure)
1Ippendix D:
script Por Experillent 2
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ProC!e~ur8
All children were tested while sitting at a small
table in a separate room in their daycare centre. The
following symbols identify the experiment.er and sUbjects:
E = experimenter, S = sUbject.
1. Familiarization With The Task:
E: "We're going to playa game. You see this box?
(show boX) It has toys in it, and in a
couple of minutes I am going to take all of the
toys out of the box and put them on tile table.
All you have to do (Child' 5 name) to play the
game is remember the toys. 'lou can do whatever
you want to remember the toys. and when you
think you can remember them all, you can tell
me and I \<1i11 put all the toys back in the box
s:
so you can guess them.
understand?" .
O.K. ? Do you
E: "If you do really well I will give you a prize"
(either of the following depending upon
SUbject's experimental grouping): (a). "I will
give you this pencil for a prize if you do
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really well. So if you do really well, I will
give you this pencil for a prize". (b). "I
will give you this package of crayons if you do
really well. Everyone just loves the crayons,
they think they're just great (said with
animation). So if you do really well, I will
give you this package of crayons for a prize".
E: "Are you ready?"
E: "Here's a (name of toy)".
(Continue until all toys are arranged in semi-
circle before the SUbject).
E: "Don't forget to tell me when you think you can
remember tt>e toys."
2. Oistracter Task and Recall of Toys:
(Remove toys from table)
E: IlNow I want you to draw me some X's and D's
just like the one I s you see on this paper ll •••
(when 30 seconds have elapsed) "O.K. that's
enough ... now tell me all the toys you can
remember" .
'0
(When recall is complete)
E: "That was really good. Let's try it again!".
3. Procedure for Trials Two and Three:
(Prior to each trial the following instructions
were given to the child)
E: "So I'll put all the toys on the table, and you
can do anything you want to remember the toys.
When you think you know them all, you'll tell
O.K.?" •
E: "Here's a (name Of toy)".
(Repeat sequence) •




